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RESTRAINTS ON CAPITAL FLOWS: WHAT ARE THEY?
ABSTRACT
Though there has been much general debate recently about the pros and
cons of capital controls, there remains substantial confusion and uncertainty about what
exactly is entailed by the term ‘restraining global capital flows’. Popular discussion around
this has typically been long on rhetoric and loose generalisations and acutely short on
specifics. The aim of this paper is therefore to help refine the debate somewhat by clarifying
and systematically categorising the various concepts that have been discussed in policy
circles and the popular media. Two specific country experiences with restraining capital
flows, viz. Chile and Malaysia are highlighted and discussed, as are the recent and much-
publicised proposals for exchange controls (a la Paul Krugman) and a global currency
transactions tax in the forms of a Tobin tax.1
1. Introduction
The 1990s have witnessed three periods of severe financial turbulence in
global financial markets. The turmoil in East Asia was preceded by the Mexican-
Tequila crisis in 1994-95 and the virtual collapse of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93. Each time a crisis has occurred, there have been calls
by policy-makers about the need for some kind of curbs on ‘speculative’ foreign
exchange (forex) transactions and global capital flows. This time has been no
different. What has however been particularly interesting as the East Asian crises
have unfolded, is the number of distinguished economists who have also recently
come out strongly against taking a completely laissez faire attitude towards
international capital flows
1. These include Joseph Stiglitz (1988a,b), the Senior Vice
President and Chief Economist of the World Bank
2; Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) of
Columbia University; Paul Krugman (1988) of MIT; Helmut Reisen (1998) of the
OECD; and Dani Rodrik (1988) of Harvard University. 
The debate has taken on a new, urgent and much-enhanced dimension, with
the recent unilateral imposition of a set of exchange and capital controls by Malaysia
in response to the recessionary conditions faced by the country (to be discussed
below). Probably most telling of all is the recent reported statement by a high-ranking
official in Hong Kong – often held up as the model free market economy by Milton
Friedman and others - of the need for a “global plan to discipline financial markets
and control the flow of funds to fight speculators.”
3 
                                                
1 This is best captured by the Economist magazine’s articles discussing the costs and benefits
of capital controls in each of the three periods: the ERM crisis (October 3, 1992, p.69), the
Tequila crisis (February 4, 1995, p.72) and the East Asian crises (January 24, 1998, pp.71-2
and March 14, 1998, p.92). Given the magazine’s ideological bent towards laissez faire, their
conclusions about capital restraints are obvious. 
2 Indeed, Stiglitz’s repeated and strong advocacy of capital restraints is in direct contradiction
to the views of the IMF (see section 3) and the US Treasury (not to mention officials in the
World Bank itself). This is reported to be a source of some tension between Stiglitz and the
IMF-Treasury combine (Muehring, 1998).     
3  Quote attributed to Hong Kong’s Finance Secretary, Donald Tsang (Business Times,
Singapore, September 9, 1998). 2
Though there has been much general debate recently about the pros and
cons of capital controls, there remains substantial confusion and uncertainty about
what exactly is entailed by the term ‘restraining global capital flows’. Popular
discussion around this has typically been long on rhetoric and loose generalisations
and acutely short on specifics. The aim of this paper is therefore to help refine the
debate somewhat by clarifying and systematically classifying the various concepts
that have been discussed in policy circles and the popular media. To preview the
main conclusion of the discussion that follows: once one moves away from the broad
conceptual level to a consideration of specifics, it is quickly realised that there exist a
multitude of forms of ‘capital restraints’. Indeed, nowhere is the adage, “the devil is in
the details” more relevant than in the discussion of this topic.
2. Brief Survey of Restraints on Capital Flows
It is important to note the fact that restraints on capital flows can be broadly
categorised into two (see Chart 1):
a) restraints on capital account transactions (capital controls);
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































One of the few to define capital controls is Fane (1998b), who refers to them
as “measures which impose quantitative restrictions, or explicitly or implicitly tax
broad categories of capital movements and which apply to all firms and households.”
As he notes though, any definition of capital controls is fairly arbitrary. As such, it is
imperative to move away from the broad, conceptual level and focus on specific types
of curbs on capital flows that are proposed or actually imposed, based on country
experiences. 
There are five main categories that make up the capital account: foreign direct
investment (FDI), portfolio investment, borrowing and lending by residents and non-
residents, transactions effected through deposit accounts, and other (miscellaneous)
capital account transactions. Thus, capital controls involve directly constraining one or
more of these elements of the capital account (Quirk et al., 1995). 
Within each of these five categories, there could exist a wide range of possible
controls. For instance: 
a)  FDI activities of either residents abroad or non-residents domestically could be
restricted. Restrictions could also take the form of repatriation of profits and
initial principal, taxes, share of ownership, etc.  
b)  Portfolio investment restrictions could take the form of regulations on the
issuance or acquisition of securities by residents overseas or by non-residents
domestically. Limitations on the repatriation of dividends and capital gains and
transfers of funds between residents and non-residents may also exist, as
may ‘market-oriented’ tax measures (such as the well known US ‘real interest
equalisation tax’).
c) Regulations on external debt transactions largely take the form of ceilings or
taxes on external debt accumulation by residents and firms (financial and non-
financial institutions). Special exemptions are often provided for in the case of5
trade-oriented enterprises or for other purposes on a case-by-case basis as
determined by the regulatory authorities.     
d)  Restrictions on deposit accounts may be imposed on forex deposits held
locally by residents and non-residents or deposits held in local currency by
residents abroad or by non-residents overseas or locally.
e)  Other capital controls entail restrictions on real estate, emigration allowance
limits and other forms of capital transfers.   
Table 1 provides a succinct summary of the types of curbs imposed and the
number of developing countries doing so, based on data available in 1994. It is to be
noted, however, that the list in the table, while indicative, is by no means exhaustive
4.   
                                                
4  For a more exhaustive list of possible forms of controls on capital and current account
transactions, see the latest country survey in the IMF’s Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions Annual Report.6
Table 1
Capital Controls in Developing Countries (155 Surveyed)
Category Number of Countries
Any form of capital control
Comprehensive Controls
a:
   on Outflows
   on Inflows
FDI
   of non-residents
   of residents
Profit repatriation and capital liquidation
Taxes on capital transactions
Non-resident-controlled enterprises
Portfolio Investments
   of non-residents
   of residents
Security Issuance by non-residents
Security Issuance abroad by residents
Debt-to-Equity Conversions
Financial Transactions
    of non-residents
    of residents
Trade-Related Financial Transactions
Deposit Requirements for borrowing from abroad by residents
Deposit Accounts
    of non-residents in foreign exchange
    of non-residents in local currency
    of residents abroad
    of residents in foreign currency with domestic banks
     
Other Capital Transfers
     Personal capital transfers
     Blocked accounts
     Real estate transactions
            of residents









    9 
    6
   61
   30
   33
   15
     6
     2
   
    78
    41
    66
      7
      2 
     
    83
    37
    52 
    29
    23
    70
    34
    24
    23
    30
Note:   a) Not explicitly defined in source 
Source:  Quirk et al. (1995)
2.2 Exchange Controls
According to Fane (1998b), exchange controls “include restrictions on the right
to remit or receive payments in foreign currencies, the right of non-residents to hold
domestic currency deposits on-shore, the right of residents to hold off-shore deposits,
and the right of residents to hold foreign currency deposits on-shore.” This definition7
however only entails quantitative restrictions, unlike those of capital controls noted
above, which include implicit and explicit taxes. Consistency therefore necessitates
that the definition of exchange controls be broadened to include measures that tax
broad categories of forex transactions to and from the country. As such, exchange
controls in this paper also encompass currency transactions taxes (such as the ‘Tobin
tax’) and dual or multiple exchange rates (the former usually divided between current
and capital account transactions, the latter involving further division between different
types of capital account transactions). 
Exchange controls are usually seen as one particular tool in restraining capital
flows (usually outflows). However they need not necessarily be a ‘subset’ of capital
controls. For instance, they may be used in the case of trade-related transactions
(also see the country case studies in sections 7 and 8).
3. The IMF and Capital Account Convertibility
The IMF does not seem to have a formal definition of capital account
convertibility. The notion of ‘convertibility’ per se refers solely to the absence of
restrictions on forex transactions, but not necessarily on international trade or capital
flows. Broadly, the IMF (1988)  defines capital account convertibility as the “freedom
from quantitative controls, taxes, and subsidies - that affect capital account
transactions between residents and non-residents. Examples of such transactions
include all credit transactions between residents and non-residents, including trade -
and nontrade-related credits and deposit transactions, and transactions in securities
and other negotiable financial claims.”
In recognition of the linkages between currency flows/payments systems and
capital flows, for all practical purposes, capital account convertibility is seen in the
wider context of liberalisation of capital account transactions in general (Greene and
Isard, 1991 and Quirk et al., 1995). Little is however available beyond this broad
definition. To illustrate the ambiguity of the IMF definition, consider Table 2, which8
lists the developing countries with no restrictions on capital account transactions
between 1973 and 1996. On the basis of the Fund’s annual reports on exchange
restrictions, Malaysia is considered to have had no capital account restrictions during
that period. This is despite the fact that Malaysia is known to have introduced a set of
measures to restrict capital inflows in January 1994, which were announced to be
temporary (see section 8).
Table 2
Developing Countries with No Restrictions on
Capital Account Transactions, 1973-96
















































Part of the reason for the Fund’s apparent lack of a clear definition is the fact
that it has no legal jurisdiction over the liberalisation of the capital account of member
countries. While current account convertibility is covered by Article VIII, no such9
obligation exists for capital account transactions
5. In fact, the Interim Committee of
the Fund’s Board of Governors agreed in September 1997 to amend the Articles of
Agreement to make capital account liberalisation one of the specific purposes of the
IMF and give it legal jurisdiction to oversee member countries’ transitions towards
capital account convertibility. It remains to be seen what (if any) follow-up there is on
the issue
6 (especially in light of the increasing dissension with unfettered capital flows
following the East Asian crises
7).
4. Thinking About Restraints on Capital Flows
The previous sections emphasise the need to be absolutely clear as to the
type and rationale of restraint(s) that could conceivably be imposed. In this light, it is
useful to consider the following three questions when evaluating restraints on capital
flows (Chart 2):
a) are the restraints selective or comprehensive?
b) are the restraints on outflows or on inflows? 
c) are the restraints temporary or permanent?
                                                
5 The Fund’s articles do actually permit the use of controls on capital account transactions. For
instance, Article VI states that the “Fund may request a member using its general resources to
impose capital controls.”  
6 See Polak (1998) for an excellent critique of the IMF’s general ‘attitude’ towards and
proposed legal jurisdiction on capital account restraints. Quirk et al. (1998) and Fischer (1998)
provide the IMF view on the issues.
7 Note that this statement is not meant to necessarily imply that ‘irrationality’ of global capital
markets was the primary reason for the current and previous crises. The point is that, rightly or
wrongly, the East Asian turmoil in particular, has undoubtedly led to a sharp appreciation in
the number of people who advocate restraining cross-border capital flows. We return to this

































































































































































4.1 Selective versus Comprehensive Restraints
In practice, there are various degrees of extensiveness of curbs on capital
flows. At the highest level, this would involve virtual inconvertibility on the capital
account, with accompanying controls on capital flows, i.e., comprehensive capital
controls. China and India are notable examples in Asia. It is more typical for a country
to impose some form of exchange controls or selective controls on one or more areas
of the capital account. 
Of the 155 countries surveyed, 119 were reported to have imposed some type
of (selective) restrictions on certain capital account transactions
8. Of the 119
countries with some controls, 67 were reported to use ‘comprehensive’ controls
(though no formal definition of what this entails is provided). However the distinction
between selective and comprehensive controls may not be so precise. For instance,
even in the case of India and China, there exists relative freedom on some forms of
capital flows (such as FDI). As such, the distinction is more one of degree rather than
kind. A generally illiberal regime (i.e. one with comprehensive controls) typically has a
‘positive’ list of exceptions to the controls, while a generally liberal regime (i.e. one
that imposes controls selectively) is likely to have a ‘negative’ list of items to be
controlled.
4.2 Restraints on Capital Outflows versus Inflows
Restraints on capital outflows are advocated for two reasons. First, they are
aimed at slowing the speed of capital outflows (if not preventing them) when a country
is faced with the possibility of a ‘sudden’ and  ‘destabilising’ withdrawal of capital
during a time of uncertainty. 
                                                
8  This contrasts with 123 countries (out of 153 surveyed) in 1990 (Mathieson and Rojas-
Suarez, 1993).12
Second, the imposition of restraints on outflows are supposed to break the link
between domestic and foreign interest rates. - This is just an application of the
‘impossible or inconsistent trilogy’, i.e. a country cannot maintain a flexible exchange
rate regime, monetary policy autonomy and an open capital accounts all at once. -
Thus, the crisis-hit economies could conceivably pursue expansionary monetary and
credit policies as a means of “growing their way out of debt” without having to worry
about possible capital flight and concomitant weakening of the currency.
Restraints on inflows serve a preventive function. The aim here is to preclude
a surge in capital inflows during ‘boom’ times, so as to minimise the chances of an
abrupt and sharp capital reversal (‘bust’) in the future (see Rajan, 1998c for an
anatomy of such ‘boom-bust’ cycles). Of the 67 developing countries imposing
‘comprehensive controls’ in 1994, all imposed them on outflows, but only 17 did so on
inflows (see Table 1). Empirical studies have indicated that capital controls have been
more effective at preventing ‘excessive’ capital build-up than at stemming capital flight
(Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993 and Reinhart and Todd Smith, 1997).
4.3 Temporary versus Permanent Restraints
Temporary restraints are seen as a deterrent to ‘excessive’ outflows or inflows
during an ‘extraordinary’ period. Thus, they may be used at a time when a country is
faced or threatened with the possibility of capital flight, so as to give policy-makers
‘breathing room’ to make appropriate policy alterations. Or conversely, they may be
imposed when an economy experiences unsustainably large capital inflows, due to
confidence in the current and potential growth prospects of the economy (‘irrational
exuberance’?). 13
The rationale behind temporary restraints are broadly two-fold. First, such capital
surges could lead to a loss of competitiveness through a real exchange rate
appreciation (so-called ‘financial Dutch Disease’ phenomenon) and generally give rise
to serious macroeconomic policy quandaries and trade-offs. 
Second, the literature on ‘optimal’ sequencing of economic liberalisation has
emphasised the need to reform the financial sector along with undertaking adequate
prudential regulation, before attempting the decontrol of capital account transactions
(see for instance, Goldstein and Turner, 1996 and Quirk et al., 1995)
9.   
Permanent controls are seen as necessary even during ‘normal’ times. The
rationale for such controls are that even if all the necessary microeconomic distortions
are revoked and macroeconomic policies are generally sound, it is possible that there
may nonetheless exist certain inherent ‘market failures’ that cause sub-optimal
decisions to be made in a decentralised and free market economy. Insofar as these
market failures are prevalent in a laissez faire economy, they may provide rationale
for instituting capital restraints on a permanent basis, rather than on an event-
specific/transitory basis
10.
Admittedly, the above categorisation is somewhat arbitrary with much overlap
in practice. However it does help systemise the thought process when evaluating
proposals for and against capital restraints (Chart 2). We use the above segmentation
to highlight and briefly describe four specific examples of restraining capital flows. We
first consider two much-publicised proposals, viz. exchange controls a la Paul
Krugman (section 5) and a global tax on forex transactions a la James Tobin (section
                                                
9 The East Asian crises have made apparent the dangers of inappropriate sequencing of the
capital account, with most of the countries being too hasty in capital account liberalisation
(Rajan, 1998a). What is interesting and particularly relevant given the regional turmoil, is the
following: granted that capital account liberalisation has been ill-sequenced and ill-timed, is
there a case for the reimposition of capital controls while the necessary financial sector
reforms are put into place?
 
10  Great care must be taken in defining the form of market failure and whether capital
restraints are necessarily the ‘first-best’ option to correct the failure. This subject is the
particular focus of Rajan (1998c).  Also see Fane (1998a).14
6). We then go on to highlight two country experiences, viz.  Chile (section 7) and
Malaysia (section 8). 
5. Exchange Controls a la Paul Krugman
There is a school of thought that argues that the austere IMF conditionalities
(i.e. tight fiscal and particularly monetary policies) for the crisis-hit economies in East
Asia have contributed to a rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the region (in
terms of current and short-term expected growth rates), while doing little by way of
stabilising exchange rate levels and variability
11. The seeming failure of this plan
(referred to as Plan A) has been the primary motivation for Krugman’s (1998)
exchange control proposal for afflicted countries in East Asia (so-called Plan B). 
Plan B broadly entails the imposition of temporary  exchange controls on
capital outflows
12. The rationale for such controls is, as previously noted, to divorce
the domestic financial market from the international one, hence allowing for
expansionary monetary policies to be pursued (no longer being constrained by the
‘impossible trilogy’), without fear of capital flight (given higher returns to be obtained
abroad) and weakening exchange rate. Before proceeding, it bears noting that from
his brief description in the Fortune magazine, Krugman does not seem to differentiate
between capital and current account (broadly trade) transactions, suggesting
exchange controls on all transactions (as opposed to, for instance, dual or multiple
                                                
11 See Rajan (1998a) for a summary of main criticisms leveled against the IMF prescriptions.
In fairness though, some degree of exchange rate stability has been restored in the countries
under the IMF plan (viz. Indonesia, Korea and Thailand), though the issue is whether this was
necessarily the least costly method of achieving the goal.
12 He has separately also come out in favour of the Chilean model as a preventive measure
once recovery in the region is well underway.
 15
exchange rates)
13. Notwithstanding the above, while the economic rationale of
Krugman’s proposal is not logically inconsistent, there exist a number of potential
drawbacks of such a policy that he has not sufficiently emphasised.
First, unlike countries like China and India, countries in this region (Thailand
and Malaysia particularly) have been extremely open, trading economies. For
instance, Malaysia’s trade-to-GDP ratio is about 2, while Thailand’s is about 1. While
the ratio is expectedly lower for Indonesia (at about 0.5 to 0.6)
14, all the economies in
Southeast Asia have been heavily dependent on FDI as a vehicle of rapid growth
(see for instance, the recent survey article by Athukorala and Hill, 1998). At a time
when there has been a global trend towards economic liberalisation, and there
consequently exists a number of alternative investment opportunities in the region
and worldwide, such a policy may lead to economies in the region being overlooked
by the international community as viable investment destinations
15. 
Second, such controls are in complete contrast to the trend towards greater
economic liberalisation that the countries in the region have been pursuing (through
binding commitments to the WTO, APEC, AFTA, etc.). Accordingly, imposition of
such ‘market-unfriendly’ policies (particularly if done unilaterally), could exacerbate
the lack of policy credibility of the authorities, which had already been much-damaged
because of the regional crises. Indeed, if such policies are imposed, the obvious
question on the minds of the private sector agents would doubtless be the following:
“If the economic situation deteriorates further, will even harsher measures be
undertaken?”
                                                
13 In fairness though, Krugman does make this distinction explicit in an open letter to the
Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad (available on Krugman’s homepage) - an after-
thought?
14 Based on 1995 data from the World Bank (1997). For comparison, the corresponding ratios
for India and China were about 0.3 and 0.4 respectively.
15 See Oxelheim (1993), who refers to a ‘global race’ for foreign investments or Contractor
(1995) who discusses the shift in the ‘bargaining power’ from sovereign
countries/governments to global investors. Rajan and Marwah (1998) draw inspiration from
these views in formalising the choice and timing of FDI.16
Third, while the Chilean example has been often cited as a case in point
regarding the virtues of restraints on capital flows, as will be discussed, the Chilean
controls are meant to restrain inflows (i.e. preventive), while those proposed by
Krugman are meant to preclude outflows
16 (i.e. curative). As noted, empirical studies
have generally found that controls on inflows are far more effective than on outflows,
with capital flight occurring as long as there is sufficient incentive to do so. Given the
consequent lowering of interest rates in the country (which is the whole idea of the
policy in the first place) on the one hand, and particularly if there is a ‘premature’
fixing of the exchange rate on the other (thus providing increased scope for its
inappropriate valuation), the incentives to evade the restraints could be very strong. In
such a case, the authorities have one of two choices. One, either forsake the controls
(and possibly go/return to the IMF if funds have flown out on a massive scale, i.e. a
typical balance-of-payments crisis). Two, attempt to close the loopholes by making
the controls comprehensive, extending them to other trade/current account
transactions as well as those relating to FDI (i.e. ‘controls beget controls’)
Fourth, there are the well-known problems relating to the potential for rent-
seeking activities (bribery, corruption and so forth) that such an administrative-
intensive measure generates, not to mention the high enforcement costs and the
inevitable creation of a black market.
Fifth, to repeat, one of the primary aims of the controls is to increase liquidity
domestically to provide credit for ‘viable’ firms remaining in operation, so as to enable
them to grow their way out of debt. However, there is an important caveat that is often
overlooked. In a decentralised economy, even if banks are flush with credit, they may
well choose to maintain excess reserves, rather than lend during recessionary
periods. This is particularly so, as the financial crisis in East Asia has contributed to a
                                                                                                                                         
 
16 Other important differences between the two, based on the catergorisation made in section
4, are that Krugman’s policies are exchange rather than capital controls, and they are
temporary rather than permanent. 17
severe contraction of the net asset positions of virtually all domestic banks. These
institutions are focused primarily on consolidating their balance sheet situations,
hence making them acutely reluctant to rollover existing loans, let alone extending
new ones
17. 
Sixth, as noted, one must question the wisdom of a unilateral introduction of
such controls in the midst of prevailing bearishness. Such a move may only
aggravate market uncertainties and be interpreted as a sign/confirmation of weak
economic fundamentals or the unsustainability of prevailing economic policies. This in
turn may exacerbate the bearish conditions already in existence. In addition, and of
most concern, historical country experiences have suggested that there is inevitably
much inertia in removing the controls, i.e. the illiberal regime once initiated tends to
become a permanent feature.
6. The Tobin Tax (TT)
18
A TT is essentially a permanent, uniform, ad-valorem transaction tax on forex
transactions which is aimed at diminishing the speculative element of forex flows. The
typical rates that are mentioned for such a tax are fairly modest, at about 0.1 - 0.25
percent. The tax must be imposed on a global basis, as it is argued that a unilateral
imposition of the tax would drive much of the forex trading offshore
19. Since the tax
can be amortized over a longer-period, the burden of a TT is claimed to be inversely
                                                
17 See Rajan (1998b) for a discussion of this problem in the context of the Japanese economy.
Indeed, it has been suggested by prominent Malaysian analyst and policy consultant, Noordin
Sopiee (1998), that the Malaysian authorities have felt it necessary to simultaneously
“pressure the banks to lend to productive sectors”. If this is so, the increasing
bureaucratisation of the economy (and the consequent scope for rent-seeking, unproductive
activities and the supplanting of the market mechanism), could lead to gross inefficiencies
hinder future growth - especially if maintained on a sustained basis.
 
18  Named after Nobel Laureate, James Tobin, Professor Emeritus at Yale University who
proposed it in 1974.
19 An alternative, closely-related proposal by Eichengreen and associates (1995, 1996) is for a
Chilean type non-interest bearing deposit requirement, which is applicable to all forex round-
trips (unlike that in Chile, which involves only inflows). 18
proportional to the length of the transaction, i.e., the shorter the holding period, the
more heavy the burden of the tax. For instance, a TT of 0.25 percent implies that a
twice daily round trip carries an annualized rate of about 350 percent, while in
contrast, a round trip made twice yearly carries a tax rate of 1 percent. Accordingly,
and considering that 80 percent of forex turnover in 1995 involved round trips of a
week or less (Rajan, 1998c), the TT ought to help reduce exchange rate volatility and
concomitantly curtail the intensity of ‘boom-bust’ cycles, while not adversely impacting
longer-term (‘productive’) capital. 
The discussion of TT has been kept intentionally brief, it being the particular
focus of Rajan (1998c) and the papers in the book by Haq et al., eds. (1996).
7. The Chilean Case
Since 1991, in response to a sharp inflow of capital (partly attracted by bullish
expectations of the economy as it underwent a successful reform program), Chile has
levied permanent and selective capital restraints, predominantly on inflows (Table 3).
The only restriction on capital outflows takes the form of a one year requirement
before investment capital may be repatriated. This is meant to discourage the entry of
short-term ‘speculative capital’ (so-called ‘hot money’). 19
Table 3
Restrictions on Capital Inflows into Chile
Type of Restriction
No restrictions on repatriation of profit of FDI, but initial investment
capital must remain in country for one year. Maximum proportion of FDI
that may be financed through debt is 50 percent
a.
Issuance of American Deposit Receipts (ADRs) by Chilean companies is
regulated. Only companies with risk classifications of BBB (for non-
financial companies) and BBB+ (for financial institutions) are permitted
to issue ADRs. Minimum account requirement as of November 1995 is
$10 mn.
Bonds issued by local companies in global markets must have an
average minimum maturity of four years in order to encourage long-term
financing.
All other portfolio flows (including foreign loans, bond issues) are subject
to a non-remunerated 10 percent reserve requirement to be deposited at
the central bank for one year interest-free
b. The reserve requirement is
independent of maturity (length of stay) of inflow.
Credit lines for trade financing operations also subject to the 10 percent
reserve requirement
b.
Notes:  a) Reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent in mid 1996
b) Initially increased from 20 to 30 percent in May 1992. Subsequently reduced to 
10 percent as of June 26, 1996 in response to a general slowdown in portfolio capital 
inflows to all emerging economies. 
Source: Compiled by author from Edwards (1998), Fane (1998b), Massod (1998), Neuhas 
et al. (1998), Quirk et al. (1995) and The Economist (March 14, 1998)
Restrictions on inflows are largely meant to favor equity over debt and
medium- and long-term capital inflows over short-term ones. There exist three broad
types of such restraints. 
First, are the implicit taxes (in the form of interest-free reserve requirements to
be deposited at the central bank) on all portfolio inflows. The deposit requirements
are meant for capital inflows of all maturities for a period of one year, after which the
central bank returns the funds. It can be shown that such a non-remunerated reserve
requirement acts as an implicit tax on capital inflows, with the rate varying inversely
with maturity. Intermittent adjustments are made to the implicit tax rate in response to
changing macroeconomic circumstances. In particular, the restraints are counter-20
cyclical in nature, being tightened during bullish periods when there is an upsurge in
capital inflows and relaxed when inflows subside. 
Second, all capital coming into Chile must be parked in the country for a
minimum one year period.
Third, Chilean firms and banks are permitted to access global debt markets
only if their credit ratings are of a minimum level/quality.
While questions regarding the effectiveness of the controls in reducing
aggregate capital inflows remain unresolved, there is nonetheless a general
consensus that they have helped lengthen the average maturity of capital inflows.
Chile has enjoyed greater levels of FDI, both relative to other Latin American
economies and as a proportion of aggregate capital inflows into the respective
countries (especially Mexico and Argentina, both of which have allowed for largely
unfettered capital flows). With relatively lower levels of external indebtedness - which
is a key criteria determining the potential vulnerability of an economy to a currency
and financial crisis (Rajan, 1998a) - and a sound financial system, the Chilean
economy has been much less impacted by the Tequila crisis of 1994-95, than other
Latin American economies
20. More generally, Chile has generally enjoyed faster and
steadier growth (both in terms of being less variable and less inflationary) compared
to either Mexico or Argentina (Neuhas et al., 1998)
21. 
                                                
20 Arguably, Chile’s success in terms of being able to avoid the Tequila crisis, may
have been responsible for a general bullishness in the economy. Paradoxically, the
enthusiasm to invest in the economy may consequently have led to the erosion of the
effectiveness of capital restraints, as participants searched for and found channels of
evasion. Thus, the very effectiveness of capital restraints in ensuring relative stability
in an economy in the short-term, could have been the reason for their eventual
ineffectiveness over the medium and longer- terms. In fact, it has been found in Chile
that a 1 percent increase in the (implicit) tax has a greater impact when trend
economic growth is low than when high (Larrain et al., 1997).
21 Some would argue that it is exactly the sound macro fundamentals and robust financial
system that have been key to Chile’s success, and not the capital controls. The point remains
though that the benefits of free capital mobility are hitherto far from certain. Insofar as that is
the case, as noted by Rodrik (1998, p.57), “where knowledge is limited, the rule for
policymakers should be, first, do no harm...(C)apital-account convertibility...is an idea whose
time has not yet come”. Stiglitz (1998b) seems to draw a broadly similar conclusion.21
The Chilean experience in the active management of capital inflows is
therefore increasingly being seen as at least indicative of the potential benefits of
restraints on capital inflows. Conversely, the Chilean model also highlights one of the
major drawbacks of capital flows. Specifically, trade credits are also subjected to the
implicit tax (thus acting as a trade barrier), because with this exemption, there could
be non-negligible evasion under the guise of trade credit. The result of this has been
that Chilean’s international trade has been somewhat adversely impacted, thus being
welfare-reducing. In other words, controls on inflows have by no means been an
unmitigated blessing
22.
8. The Malaysian Case
The Malaysian experience with capital controls may be broadly divided into
two episodes. In the first period, in 1994, it was faced with massive surges in capital
inflows. This in turn may be attributed to a combination of factors, including: 
a) the economy’s sustained, high and non-inflationary growth (economic growth
hovering at around 8-9 percent and inflation at between 3-4 percent since
1990); 
b)  the interest premium offered by Malaysia (of about 4 to 5 percent over US
one month LIBOR rate); and 
c) the stable bilateral exchange rate relative to the US$
23. 
In response, the monetary authorities (Bank Negara) implemented a series of
selective, temporary measures to limit ‘speculative’ inflows (Table 4)
24. Controls on
inflows included banks being subject to a ceiling on non-trade or non-investment
                                                
22  While financial innovations and advances in communications technologies have made
capital controls increasingly porous, empirical studies do show that capital controls are most
effective when combined with restraints on trade (and more broadly, current account)
transactions (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993).
23 Data from Rajan (1998a) and Quirk et al. (1995)
24 There were also some restrictions on capital outflows detailed in Fane (1998a,b).22
related external liabilities and a ban on the sale of Malaysian monetary instruments by
residents to non-residents and limits on external debt accumulation in ‘non-
productive’ activities by Malaysian banks
25. The controls, along with a sharp decline in
Malaysia’s interest rate differential (which had been on a declining trend), in turn led
to an abrupt and steep fall in net capital inflows from 17.4 percent of GDP in 1993 to
1.5 percent in 1994 (Rajan 1998a).
Table 4
Restrictions on Capital Inflows into Malaysia, January-August 1994
Type of Restriction
Banks subjected to ceiling on non-trade or non-investment related external
liabilities.
Residents prohibited from selling short-term monetary instruments to non-
residents.
Commercial banks required to deposit with Bank Negara the ringgit funds of
foreign banking institutions (Vostro accounts) held in non-interest bearing
accounts.
Commercial banks not allowed to undertake non-trade related swap and
outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers.
 
Source: Reinhart and Todd Smith (1997) and Quirk et al. (1995)
In the second and latest period, on September 1, 1998, Malaysia announced a
package of wide-ranging and selective exchange and capital (i.e. on portfolio and
deposit accounts) quantitative restraints on outflows
26. At the time of writing, it
                                                
25 To the extent that residents were limited in foreign currency borrowings from Malaysian
banks, implicitly, the above regulation has been binding on all residents (bank and non-bank).
26 According to press reports, the Malaysian authorities threatened the imposition of temporary
and selective controls on forex and share trading during the height of the crisis in August 1997
to prevent capital outflows (Wong, 1998).This only seemed to intensify the short-selling of the
Malaysian ringgit and other regional currencies. Taking this argument further, the parallels
between the Latin American Tequila crisis and the East Asian Tom-Yam (contagion effect)
one is intriguing. In the former, Brazil was relatively less impacted than Mexico and Argentina,
arguably because most of the debt in Brazil was domestic in nature (unlike the short-term
external debt of the other two economies). Similarly, in the case of East Asia, Malaysia’s debt
has been predominantly domestic, unlike the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea.23
remains unclear as to whether the controls are to be temporary or permanent (see
footnote 30). Table 5 summarises the controls announced. While exact details may
change as the restrictions are implemented and modified, key among the measures
announced thus far, include the forced liquidation of offshore ringgit accounts by
residents and non-residents, a ban on the provision of credit facilities to non-
residents, and the one year holding period requirement prior to the sale of Malaysian
securities.
Table 5
Restrictions on Capital Outflows by Malaysia as of September 1, 1998
Type of Restriction
External Accounts
Transfers of between external accounts would require prior approval for any amount.
Transfers to resident accounts in Malaysian banks are permitted until Sept 30, 1998.
Thereafter, such transfers require approval.
Sources of funding the external account are limited to:
- Proceeds from sale of ringgit instruments, securities registered in Malaysia or other
assets in Malaysia;
-  Salaries, wages, commissions, interest, dividend;
-  Sale of foreign currency.
Use of funds in the account is limited to the purchase of ringgit assets in Malaysia.
General Payments
Generally residents are freely allowed to make payments to non-residents for any
purpose up to RM10,0000 or its equivalent in foreign currency (reduction in amount),
except for all payment for imports of goods and services.
Generally residents are freely allowed to make payments to non-residents in foreign
currency only for amounts exceeding RM10,000 equivalent. However, investments
abroad in any form and payments under a guarantee for non-trade purposes require
approval.
Export of Goods
Prescribed manner of payment for exports in foreign currency only, other than
currencies of Israel, Serbia and Montenegro.
Credit Facilities to Non-Residents
Domestic credit facilities to non-resident correspondent banks and non-resident
stockbroking companies are no longer allowed.
Investments Abroad
Residents with no domestic borrowing are allowed to make payment to non-
residents for purpose of investing abroad, up to an amount of RM10,000 or its
equivalent in foreign currency per transaction.
All residents require prior approval to make payments to non-residents for purposes24
of investing abroad, for an amount exceeding RM10,000 equivalent in foreign
currency.
Foreign Currency Credit Facilities and Ringgit Credit Facilities from Non-residents
Residents are not allowed to obtain ringgit credit facilities from any non-resident
individuals.
  Securities
Ringgit securities are required to be deposited with authorized depositories.
Ringgit securities held by non-residents must be transacted through an authorized
depository for good delivery.
All payments by non-residents for any security registered in Malaysia must be made
in foreign currency or in ringgit from an external account.
All proceeds in ringgit received by a non-resident from the sale of any resident
security must be retained in an external account (subject to the conditions on such
accounts). However, should the ringgit security be held for more than one year,
proceeds from the sale of such securities can be:
- converted immediately to foreign currency;
- or credited to the external account.
All payments to residents for any security registered outside Malaysia from non-
residents must be made in foreign currency only
Import and Export of Currency Notes, Bills of Exchange, Assurance Policies, etc.
A resident traveller is permitted to import:
- ringgit notes up to RM1,000 only; and
- any amount of foreign currencies.
A resident traveller is permitted to export:
- ringgit notes up to RM1,000 only; and
- any amount of foreign currencies up to the equivalent of RM10,000.
A non-resident traveller is permitted to import:
- ringgit notes up to RM1,000 only; and
- any amount of foreign currencies.
A non-resident traveller is permitted to export:
- ringgit notes up to RM1,000 only and
- foreign currencies up to the amount of the foreign currencies brought into Malaysia.
Prior approval is required for the import and export of ringgit notes and the export of
foreign currency notes, other than as permitted above.
[Transitional Provision: Up to Sept 30, permission is given to a traveller (resident and
non-resident) to import any amount of ringgit on his person or in his baggage.]
Source: Bank of Negara (as reported in Business Times, September 2, 1998 and Straits Times, 
Singapore, September 2, 1998)
Malaysia’s measures highlight the difficulties in solely restraining capital
outflows without hindering trade and broader current account transactions, particularly
when exchange controls are the primary instrument. For instance, there exist forex
rules against exports and imports, with all trade transactions needing to be
undertaken in foreign currencies. Further, tourists are limited to traveling in and out of25
Malaysia with a maximum of RM1,000. While no limit exists on such transactions in
foreign currencies for non-residents and residents coming back into Malaysia,
residents are limited to an equivalent of RM10,000 when leaving the country. While
these controls may be needed to minimise evasion of the capital controls through
these channels, the point is that these transactions are all current account ones.
There is also the related question of whether such measures are IMF-legal
27. 
The economic motivation for the measures announced and implemented by
the Malaysian authorities is broadly twofold:
First, as noted in section 6, the aim is to regain monetary autonomy, thus
allowing Malaysia to pursue a low interest rate policy to stimulate growth in the
recession-hit economy
28, without it having significant downward pressure on the
currency
29. 
Second, by forcing the liquidation of external/offshore accounts, - which are
roughly estimated at between RM20-25 million - the intention is to preclude
speculative attacks on the currency, without impacting FDI flows.
  It is obviously too soon to determine whether the policy option pursued by the
Malaysian authorities will succeed. Suffice it to note here that, apart from the potential
drawbacks of exchange controls referred to in section 6, to the extent that the
Malaysian authorities have not been upfront or explicit about how long the controls
are to be in place (either in terms of time period or an objective criteria of economic
                                                
27  All the crises-affected East Asian economies have accepted the obligations of the IMF
Article VIII, which requires free current account convertibility. Specifically, Malaysia did so way
back in 1968, Indonesia and Korea did so in 1988 and Thailand in 1990. Even China and India
have recently accepted the obligations of the Article VIII status.  
28 Malaysia’s economy shrank 2.8 and 6.8 percent in the first and second quarters of 1998
respectively. This is its first recession (defined as two consecutive quarters of negative
growth) in 13 years and the second in more than 40 years (Sopiee, 1998).
  
29  Indeed, Bank Negara immediately proceeded to cut the benchmark interest rate to 8
percent from 9.5 percent, the statutory reserve requirement from 6 percent to 4 percent, raised
fiscal spending by 20 percent and fixed the ringgit to 3.8 per US$. The authorities also
announced a substantial loosening of the criterion used for defining non-performing loans
(double the global standard of three months).26
performance to be attained before lifting of the controls), this has added an additional
dimension to market uncertainty
30.
9. Conclusion
This main purpose of this paper has been to help clarify thinking on the notion
of restraints on capital account transactions, rather than provide a detailed analysis of
their economic rationale. To this end, a categorisation of capital restraints has been
provided to assist in the evaluation of various proposals for and against capital
restraints. 
It has been noted that restraints on capital flows may be divided into control
on capital account transactions per se (capital controls) and controls on foreign
exchange transactions (exchange controls). It has been emphasised that when
analysing curbs on capital flows, the three key features to keep in mind are whether
they are comprehensive or selective; whether they are meant to be temporary or
permanent; and whether they are imposed on outflows or inflows. Two specific
country experiences with restraining capital flows, viz. Chile and Malaysia have been
highlighted and discussed, as have the recent and much-publicised proposal for
exchange controls by Paul Krugman and the Tobin tax.
While the debate on the pros, cons and effectiveness of restraints on capital
flows has invariably intensified with the onset of any currency and financial crisis, on
balance, the opponents of such restraints have thus far prevailed. However the
magnitude (in terms of the depth, breadth and longevity) of the East Asian crises
have, rightly or wrongly, given renewed and unprecedented vigour to proponents of
restraining cross-border capital flows. Importantly, the current turmoil has visibly won
                                                
30 For instance, the Malaysian Prime Minister was quoted as saying of the capital controls that
they “can be permanent. But on the other hand, if the international community agrees that
currency trading must be regulated and that the range that currency can fluctuate is
limited...then we will return to the free-exchange rate system” (see interview in the Straits
Times, Singapore, September 2, 1998, p.7).    27
over many more supporters, including some distinguished, ‘main stream’ economists
and an increasing number of policy-makers in Asia and elsewhere. 
In some senses, we have as close to a ‘laboratory experiment’ as one might
hope for in economics, with the Malaysian dirigiste approach to stabilisation and
recovery at one end and countries that have - at least thus far - remained under the
auspices of the IMF prescriptions  (Indonesia, Korea, but particularly Thailand, given
its relatively greater comparability to Malaysia) on the other
31. If the Malaysian
strategy is perceived as working and being more successful than countries following
the formula mandated by the IMF, other countries may well be tempted to emulate the
Malaysian example. It warrants keeping in mind though, that Malaysia’s is but one
possible model or approach to curbing capital flows, which could take any number of
guises.
                                                
31 Admittedly, a full analysis/comparison of the strategies to cope with and recover from the
regional crises by Malaysia and the other countries, needs to include the political dimensions
in each of the countries. These issues are necessarily beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice
it to note that the issues to be tackled include, for instance, the May riots in Indonesia and the
resulting stepping-down by President Suharto, and the sacking of the Deputy Prime Minister,
Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia. This apart, a cynic might argue that it is in the strategic interest of
the IMF-Treasury combine (a la Bhagwati, 1998) to see that Malaysia’s policy experiment -
which is completely contrary to what they have been advocating for the region and emerging
markets in general - does not succeed. 28
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